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Business and Social Mobility into the British Elite 1870-1914 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper tests the claim that business stimulated general social mobility into the British elite 
during the heyday of the laissez-faire Victorian economy. It also investigates an alternative 
hypothesis that the ‘rise of the professions’ was the main driver. Intergenerational mobility into the 
elite was indeed higher among those with manually employed fathers working in business than 
among the non-business elites in Britain between 1870 and 1914. In addition two potential 
influences on mobility, education and religion, varied significantly between the classes. 
Educational divergences reflected the different markets at which those upwardly mobile in 
business, the professions and the civil service were aimed. Religious variations mirrored class 
position without independent effects on mobility. Despite a positive business contribution, 
mobility from the sons of manual workers was extremely low. Availability of capital was a key, 
not only for elite entry through business, but also for the formal education that determined access 
to the professions.  
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Business and Social Mobility into the British Elite 1870-1914
*
 
James Foreman-Peck and Julia A. Smith 
 
In a business-dominated society entrepreneurship supposedly ensures that the elite is 
forever changing, ‘recruited from below’ (Schumpeter 1961; 156)1. The process is driven by the 
growth and decline of firms and by entry and exit from their industries. As more productive 
businesses expand and the less productive contract, new business leaders emerge and economic 
growth is maintained (Lansbury and Mayes 1996). More rapid economic growth may also be 
accompanied by greater mobility into the elite (Hassler and Rodriguez Mora 2000). Conversely 
any failure of business vigour can contribute to social rigidity. Low or falling social elite mobility 
may lead to a stagnation of ideas and attitudes, a deterioration in the quality of society’s leaders, 
retarding economic growth and development (Pareto 1935; Brezis and Crouzet 1999). 
Society consists of a great many more players than business though. Politicians, 
bureaucrats, professionals, rentiers, workers, all promote or discourage social mobility and 
growth. The British economy between 1870 and 1914 was a unique combination of free enterprise 
market relations superimposed upon traditional land-owner politics
2
. According to one contested 
view, a landed class supposedly promoted gentry values throughout society, particularly 
embracing those upwardly mobile through business, and sapping their economic vitality (Wiener 
1981, Rubinstein 1993, Thompson 2001). ‘Gentrification’, on this interpretation, involved 
ossification of the elite.  
In the same period and sometimes for this reason, the family firm has been charged 
frequently, albeit inconclusively, with conservatism and retarding the development of the British 
economy (Payne 1978, Rose 1994). Top management positions in family firms were allocated by 
virtue of birth rather than competence, slowing elite ‘circulation’. Entrepreneurial career paths 
were becoming less common in the later nineteenth century (Miles 1993 Table 2.7)
3
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1
 Joseph Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development was first published in 1911. 
2
  For example ‘ Much like the characterizations of competitive industries that one finds in today’s microeconomics 
textbooks, Britain’s major nineteenth century staple industries … were composed of numerous firms with small 
market shares.’ (Elbaum and Lazonick 1986 3) 
3
 Harold Perkin also asserts that social mobility through business was becoming more difficult.‘ For some such as the 
bank, insurance and commercial clerks, the ladder might lead to branch management or even a partnership , though 
this was becoming increasingly rare for those without capital or connections’ (Perkin 1990 98) 
 4 
At the same time Britain began to experience ‘the rise of the professions’ in both private 
and public sectors, where competitive exams rather than preferment became increasingly 
important. British professionals, outside the civil service and the Churches, were distinguished 
both by their self-employed status and by belonging to organisations with strictly defined 
admission criteria (Lengyel 1999). Greater social mobility was possible because of the stronger 
demand for the services of these people (Perkin 1990 Table 3.1 80). Meritocratic professions then, 
rather than business, may have been the principal driver of new entrants to the elite. 
The present paper adjudicates between these opposed views of social mobility 
(‘Schumpeter’ versus ‘Perkin’ in shorthand) into the British elite in the later Victorian and 
Edwardian periods. In so doing it uncovers some of the sources and constraints upon social success 
for those not born into the upper echelons of society. The following section (1) outlines the 
relevant elements of British social structure in the late Victorian period. Section 2 discusses the 
measurement of social mobility in the current context. Section 3 describes the data used to address 
the two views. The results are analysed in section 4. 
 
1. British Social Structure 1870-1914 
Peter Temin (1999) identified the political and business elites in the U.S. as those at the top 
of their respective ladders. By contrast, supposedly there was one ‘society’ in the less federal, late 
nineteenth century Britain; the rich, the powerful and the exceptionally successful (Perkin 1990 
63). The upper ranks of the business community were fully assimilated with the aristocracy (Cassis 
1994 xviii). A measure of the integration of British business and social or political elites is that one 
half of all railway chief executives recruited in this period were knighted (Gourvish 1973). 
For the nineteenth century and earlier, property and in particular land ownership rather 
than occupation, was more fundamental to status especially to the upper strata of society. The 
social position of the traditional, non-business, elite was based upon land (for example Pollard 
1989 esp.228). Their distant roots lay in the fixed agricultural area owned by a few wealthy people, 
lords, who controlled the State (for example, North, 1990; 96). Even after the disappearance of 
serfdom, a small number of land-owners maintained their wealth over generations in Britain by 
primogeniture, or alternatively, by ensuring that ‘wealth’ married ‘wealth’, reducing the dispersal 
of assets passed on to more than one child.  
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‘The extreme inequality of Victorian income and wealth was rooted in the 
special economic and political dominance of the English landed aristocracy. ...In 
England and Wales in 1873 the most landed 5 per cent held 79 per cent of all 
real-estate value. Of the countries for which we have comparable early data on 
landownership, only Mexico in 1923 yielded figures showing such concentration.’ 
(Lindert, 1994; p.378). 
 
Education at ‘public’ schools (by contrast with private tutors) ensured the transmission of 
values and skills that would avoid dissipation of wealth and authority (Sanderson, 1999). 
Effectively disinherited younger sons received employment by the British state in the armed and 
civil services and the Church (of England)
4
. The two ancient English Universities were 
traditionally focussed on providing personnel for the established Church. ‘Until the 1870s more 
than 60 per cent of the graduates of Oxford and Cambridge became Anglican clergymen’ 
(Rubinstein, 1993 98). Around this ruling class grew up a professional elite based more upon 
merit, especially in law. Landowners were the natural recruiting ground for the British elite but 
they needed competent support from outside their ranks as well. 
The state responded to pressures for greater national efficiency. Competitive exams for the 
civil service were introduced between 1855 and 1870 to replace patronage. Purchase of cavalry 
and infantry commissions was abolished in 1871. Increased public expenditure on education gave 
greater access to investment in human capital despite an absence of inherited wealth and powerful 
family connections. Between 1850 and 1859 public expenditure on education grew more than six 
times- admittedly from a very low base- and numbers of (elementary) schools increased by one 
quarter. The 1870 Education Act established School Boards, financed from rates, with powers to 
make education compulsory within their areas (Curtis 1967 249-267; Mitch 1986).  
These changes may be expected to have increased opportunities for the talented, born into 
less well-resourced social strata, quite independently of the progress of business and 
entrepreneurship. In western Europe as a whole, where state intervention was more pervasive, 
business elites apparently did become more open than the American business ‘leaders’ class 
(Kaelble, 1980). 
The business elite may be divided into three groups; founders of firms, inheritors of family 
businesses and independent professional managers. Each of these offered different opportunities 
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 When Lord Randolph Churchill died aged 46 in 1895, his wife had nowhere to live although his elder brother was 
Duke of Marlborough, inheriting the estate of Blenheim Palace. His son, Winston Churchill, was obliged to earn a 
living in the Army and as a war correspondent.  
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for mobility into and out of the elite. A fourth category who worked in business is employees who 
made their way into the elite by other means than direct control of business, such as trade union 
leaders.  
Founders of firms do not necessarily possess a monopoly of entrepreneurship in the 
broadest sense, which must also embrace the activities of innovative professional managers and 
family firm owners. In a competitive market economy survival and success of both professional 
managers and family firm owners usually requires innovation. A thorough examination of the 
Schumpeter doctrine of social mobility therefore ideally requires consideration of the differential 
effect on mobility into the elite of the three types of businessmen. 
With less than perfect capital markets, a potential firm founder’s access to capital, may be 
restricted to what family and friends were able and willing to supply. Social mobility through 
business then depended on two factors; how much equity capital was needed to found a business 
sufficiently successful to propel its owner into the national elite, and, how available that capital 
was to the lower social strata. Owners of large family firms, inheritors of their capital, were a drag 
on social mobility but competition ensured they would be less so than landowners. Their 
opportunities for downward mobility, as their business declined, were much greater.  
Figure 1 offers a classification of the elite and their relation with other social strata. The 
‘elite’ are balanced on top of the 10 classes from which they are selected in the Figure. Broadly 
interpreted, the two mobility views cover the possibility of arrival at ‘the top’ from all social strata; 
this is our concern, with only one destination category, the elite, but with all the origin groups of 
the Figure.  
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
Consistent with both ‘the rise of the professions’ and the Schumpeterian view of business, 
there is now firm quantitative evidence of rising (occupational) mobility in later nineteenth century 
Britain (Miles 1993, 1999 ch. 3). The entry of nouveau riche businessmen into elite circles in late 
Victorian Britain was also widely noted (for example Perkin 1990 64-6). Yet this observation is 
compatible with very little mobility for most social strata. So also is David Jeremy’s (1998) survey 
that concludes from the industrial revolution and for much of the twentieth century British 
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business leaders originated from the middle and professional classes. Climbing a business ladder 
from rags to riches was rare in Britain, in the rest of western Europe and in the United States
5
.  
There was more scope for mobility from employee to employer in a dynamic industry. A 
survey of Lancashire textile towns just before the first world war showed 76% of managerial 
respondents in weaving and manufacturing firms were first generation, having originated from the 
‘operative classes’ or classes with comparable earnings (Chapman and Marquis 1912). But these 
were small firms, not headed by members of the elite. Continuation school data from the same area 
and period showed that father’s occupation was always the most common occupation of sons 
(Chapman  and Abbott 1913).  
What evidence there is of professional mobility suggests the legal profession was even less 
favourable than big business. Of 431 barristers admitted to Lincoln’s Inn between 1886 and 1893 
none had fathers in the skilled or unskilled ‘wage earning’ classes. The same was true of 76 
‘Benchers’ of the Middle Temple between 1886 and 1912 (Ginsberg 1929).  
 
2. Measuring Social Mobility  
Later twentieth century analysts of social mobility typically chose occupation as indicators 
of class
6
. Measures of social mobility have therefore summarised the chances of movement of sons 
from fathers’ occupational status. A common approach has been to construct a matrix, the rows of 
which are fathers in different classes and the columns are sons in the various classes. A single cell 
of this array is the number of sons in class i with fathers in class j.  A ‘transition probability’ is the 
chance of a son being in class i given that the father was in class j.  Perfect mobility pertains when 
the rows and the columns are independent; when the chance of a son being in a given class is 
independent of the father’s class position. Lack of independence can be analysed with log-linear 
models that allow a comparison of actual and predicted cell frequencies. 
Considering the origins of member of a particular social class or group is less complex than 
that of every social stratum. The second requires an interpretation of a matrix of movements 
between categories- over time or between groups- whereas the first needs only the investigation of 
a single column of changes. Even simpler is the analysis of movement between only two classes, 
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 Nonetheless upwards social mobility became a central part of the Victorian business myth, driven by Samuel Smiles 
writings (Miles 1999, 1). 
6
 For example Goldthorpe (1980) and Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992).  
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such as ’being in the elite with a landowner or company director father ’ and ‘being in the elite 
without a landowner or company director father’.  
As already noted, social mobility has usually been measured by the chances of originating 
in one class and ending up in another. Peter Temin (1999) has pointed out that, where analysis of 
elites is concerned, the small size of the group compared with others- such as all manual workers- 
means that the transition probabilities are extremely small. He therefore maintains that there is a 
case for considering instead the chances of originating in a particular social group and being in the 
elite. The relation between this measure and the more conventional index depends on the relative 
sizes of the social group in question and the elite, being determined by the inverse probability rule. 
In the present paper we follow Temin. One consequence is that those factors influencing 
the probabilities of interest pertain to elite members, not to the population as a whole. A concern is 
the influence of business or other occupation upon the chances of someone in the elite originating 
in a certain class. This is not the same as the influence of business or other occupation upon the 
probability of a member of a certain class joining the elite. Again, the relationship between the two 
depends upon the relative proportions of those from the class of interest employed in business and 
those in the elite in a business occupation (see Appendix A).   
Isolating other contributory factors (say secondary education) to social mobility 
necessitates distinguishing between two groups. The first is those now in the elite, who originated 
in class i, working in business. The second is those in the same category but who arrived where 
they did because of, say, receiving secondary education, not because business proved an effective 
means of climbing the social ladder.  
In late Victorian Britain secondary education was rare (because state supported education 
was in effect restricted to primary) but predominant in the elite. Few sons of manual workers in the 
population as a whole received secondary education. But if secondary education were an 
independent contributor to mobility into the elite we would expect a considerably higher chance 
that sons of manual workers in the elite would have it. However we consider the related probability 
of sons of manual workers in the elite, not in the population as a whole, receiving secondary 
education. Once more the relationship between these two probabilities, from the inverse 
probability rule, depends on the relative sizes of the two groups, members of class i with business 
occupations and secondary education, and  members of the elite with business occupations and 
secondary education.  
 9 
A simpler way of presenting the tests permitted by a series of cross-tabulation is in a logit 
equation. This equation has the additional advantage of estimating the effect of continuous as well 
as categorical variables on the chances of moving between two classes.  From  a logit equation can 
be inferred equation (1) below. 
Pi0 = f(B, Zi)  …(1) 
 where Pi0 , the probability of any elite member i originating in the group 0 (for example 
‘without a landowner or company director father’) depends on business occupation or not (B) and  
Zi,, a variety of other factors that influence the chances of being in the elite
7
.  
Separation of the various effects on the probability Pi0 allows discrimination between a 
pure ‘businessman’ effect on mobility (B), and the use of business as a channel for mobility by 
specific groups. In equation 1 the Zs may include for example secondary education (Z1 say).  If the 
businessman category is still statistically significant when Z1 is included then the null hypotheses 
that there is no independent business effect can be rejected; more informally, there is an 
independent ‘business effect’. Conversely, if secondary education is relevant to social mobility 
even after the impact of business has been controlled, a genuine education effect has been 
established.   
Z1 in equation (1) can have both, or either of, a direct and an indirect impact The indirect 
route is that education may influence the choice of a business career, B = B(Z1), and the choice of 
a business career may influence mobility.  
In addition a full investigation of the business and mobility hypothesis requires a 
disaggregation of different types of business occupation; founder, owner and manager for instance 
may each exercise a different effect on mobility. 
The analysis can be extended to cover a more detailed classification of the social origins of 
those moving into the elite. Perhaps members of the elite with manual worker fathers were entirely 
different from all others and a three category version of equation (1) should be estimated. 
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 The function, f, that links the probability of being in one category rather than another to explanatory variables, is 
assumed to be cumulative logistic. That is; 
Pi0=e 
X i
/ (e 
X i
 +1) …..(2) 
It follows that   
Log (Pi0/(1- Pi0)) = Log (Pi0/Pi1)=
 X i       …(3) 
The log of the ‘odds ratio’ in (3) is a linear function of Xi. It is apparent from the functional form of (2) that the 
parameter estimate, , is not the same as the change in the probability of being in the elite with a landowner father in 
response to a small change in X.  This marginal effect varies with the value of X, because the cumulative logistic 
function (2) is non-linear. 
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Parameters are then obtained for two sets of log odds ratios (log (Pij/(1- Pij)));  for those in the elite 
with manual fathers relative to those with landowner or company director fathers, and for those in 
the elite with non-manual, non-landowner and non-company director fathers relative to the same 
reference group
8
.  
Turning to the independent variables to be included in the estimating equation and their 
expected signs, both more and larger companies and an expanding civil service created greater 
opportunities for a bureaucratic career in the later nineteenth century. These careers are correlated 
with greater mobility in Andrew Miles’ (1993) data. On the one hand business may have been less 
conducive to social mobility generally because access to capital was rationed according to what 
could be provided by friends and family. On the other, mobility through the professions or the civil 
service may have been restricted to those whose families could raise the money for an elite 
education (cf Rubinstein 1986 192). State initiatives could have left a smaller role for patronage 
but again it is not clear which group, business or the professions, would be the principal 
beneficiaries.  
The distinction between markets and hierarchies in selecting and rejecting people for 
reward does not exactly correspond to business and non-business. Both businesses and professions 
were obliged to sell their services but the market for the first could be more impersonal than for the 
second. The sign on ‘business’ is positive according to the Schumpeter hypothesis and negative on 
that of Perkin, but may differ between origin classes. 
Four broad categories of non-business or occupational variables (Zi) that might explain or 
be associated with mobility into the elite are education, religious denomination, political 
participation and father’s wealth. A category may merely reflect the class origin of the elite 
member; landowners’ sons are likely to attend public school and sons of manual workers will not. 
Or they may capture something distinctive relative to the elite about the individual. In addition 
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 The multinomial logit model in this case is  
Pij =  e 
X i
 / j e 
X i,      j=0,1,2 ….(4) 
The marginal effects are 
 =Pj/Xi,  j=0,1,2 
where Pj is the conditional probability of having a father in class j and being in the elite. It can be shown that 
 = Pj(j - *) where *=j=0 
j=2
 Pj j 
Thus the coefficients estimated in this model may have different signs from the marginal effects in which the principal 
interest lies (Greene 1995 916). For this reason, only marginal effects are reported below. 
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slow social changes such as the diffusion of education or literacy might be measured only by a 
time variable, the date of birth of the elite member
9
. 
During the nineteenth century religious denominations were among the more observable 
sub-cultures and were not rationed or distributed in the population in the same way as education. 
So for example membership of the Church of Scotland is an approximate identifier of Scots in the 
British elite
10
. Religion may differ between business and non-business and be the real determinant 
of social mobility. Religion could exert an influence through information and credit networks; 
Scottish Free Church families were prominent in Scottish shipping, shipbuilding and marine 
engineering industries, and spread their economic activities far beyond the Scottish borders (Moss 
and Slaven 1998 84). Or a religion may encourage particular dispositions; for Martin Wiener 
(1981 111) 
‘…one can almost speak of a consensus of gentry values and attitudes held in Anglicanism 
from Right to Left.’ 
If so the spread of a religious denomination through society, or a section of it, in particular 
business, can be a cultural component of an explanation for mobility. 
Father’s wealth almost certainly affects the chances of being in the elite because it is an 
alternative definition of class position. Manual workers are less likely to bequeath sufficient 
wealth to appear in the records, so the variable would restrict the data set, though for the remaining 
cases greater wealth reduces the chances of being in the elite with a manual father. While this is 
obvious, the point of including the variable is as a control rather than for its own sake. For those 
with upper class fathers, (9 and 10), the opposite argument applies and a positive coefficient is 
expected. The variable also provides one simple measure of capital access. 
Political participation might be thought an essential qualification for entry to the elite. But 
politics is a time-consuming occupation that must detract from other career concerns. So again 
possibly the sign will differ between origin groups. 
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 Tom Nicholas (1999) examines the relationship between similar variables and a measure of entrepreneurial 
performance based on the ratio of wealth at death to inherited wealth. This study restricted to business, unlike the 
present one, is not concerned with social mobility, though accumulating great wealth would no doubt be conducive to 
upward mobility. Moreover his performance measure is undefined for those who inherit nothing, as would be typical 
of those with manual occupation fathers, one of the concerns here. 
10
 The measure excludes Scottish Episcopalians and Roman Catholics though. In 1690 the Scottish Presbyterian 
Church was ‘established’. 
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3. The Elite Data Set 
The Perkin-Rubinstein ‘British elites’ data set (SSRC 1977) permits a detailed 
investigation into differences and similarities between those working in business- manufacturing 
and commerce (including finance)- and other members of those identified as ‘the elite’. A subset 
of those elite members who died before the First World War (575 individuals) has been created 
(see  Appendix B). The data have been extended to identify where possible those members of the 
elite who founded a business, on the grounds that this was clearly an entrepreneurial activity of 
central concern in the Schumpeter hypothesis, whereas family firm managers may be less vital. 
Those in business are identified by their first or second occupation being in manufacturing or 
commerce.
11
  
With reliance on family, and very little compensation by the State for low family 
endowments, the data confirm that late Victorian Britain was certainly no model of perfect 
mobility; there are no sons with unskilled or semi-skilled manual worker fathers in the elite. As 
late as 1911 the unrepresented unskilled and semiskilled manual group accounted for almost half 
of the population (44%) (Jeremy, 1998; p.383). However some with skilled manual fathers did 
manage to enter the ranks of British elite while working in business.  
Table 1: Father's Occupations of  Members of the British Elite 
Business versus Non-business 
Father’s occupational 
class 
Percentage of the 
business elite sample  
Percentage of the 
non-business elite 
sample  
Whole elite sample  
Manual (1-4) 5.9% 1.5% 3.1% 
Middle class (5-8) 28.4% 49.7% 41.7% 
Upper class (9-10) 65.7% 48.8% 55.2% 
Upper class 
(non-landowner)  (9) 
60.7%  8.0% 28.0% 
Landowner (10) 4.9% 40.8% 27.2% 
Subsample total    
Shares of total elite 
sample  
37.8% 62.2% 100%- 
Source: calculated from the modified Perkin-Rubinstein dataset. 
In accordance with the Schumpeter hypothesis, Table 1 shows that a higher proportion of 
the elite who worked in business (5.9%) had skilled manual fathers and manual and non-manual 
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 Rather than in Agriculture, the Professions, Services or Public Administration and Defence.  
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supervisory fathers (30 per cent of the population) than did the elite with other occupations (1.5%) 
(2 = 8.01, p=0.4%). Even if Trade Union leaders are removed from the sample, the proportions 
are still 4.0% and 1.2%. On the other hand, class 5 (lower professional fathers) was well 
represented in the non-business elite compared with business. So overall the middle 
class-originating members of the elite arrived there because of non-business connections - 
contrary to what might be expected from the Schumpeter doctrine and consistent with Perkin’s 
‘professionalisation’.  
How much did differential access to capital by family background affect the chances of 
mobility into the elite through business? With the extreme exception of landowners, there is little 
variation in Table 2 between class origins in the chances of founding a firm and being in the elite. 
Yet it would be wrong to conclude from the ‘founder’ percentages that differential access to capital 
by family background had no effect. The chances of establishing a successful firm and being in the 
elite were very different between those of various social origins, primarily because there were in 
the population many more persons with manual worker fathers than with middle class occupation 
fathers.  
Table 2: Family Firms and Founders in the British Elite 
Father’s 
occupational class 
Percentage of 
persons identified as 
founding company 
Percentage of  
persons identified 
as in family firms 
Manual (1-4) 5.9 0 
Middle class (5-8) 6.7 6.2 
Upper class (9-10) 3.7 13.1 
Upper class 
(non-landowner)  (9) 
7.3 25.8 
Landowner (10) 0 0 
The proportion in family firms rises with the social scale (up to class 9 ‘non-landowner 
upper class’) in Table 2. This demonstrates the importance of access to wealth for elite 
membership. Family firm owners in the elite are much more likely among those originating from 
the upper class. The family firm at first sight is a conservative or restraining influence on social 
mobility. One quarter of elite members with fathers in class 9 were backed by family businesses 
(Table 2), a far higher proportion than for those originating from other classes
12
. 
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 .  Such firms could however provide the income for radical political careers. The  ‘Free-Trader’ John Bright 
(1811-1889) is a case in point. Joining the rapidly growing family cotton manufacturing business, he was deeply 
committed to the achievement of political and religious equality. 
 14 
On the basis of these two cross-tabulations then a simple specification of the Schumpeter 
hypothesis requires qualification, partly because of the impact of family firms and partly because 
new firm formation was of minor significance. Possibly also general mobility through business 
was less attractive for sons of middle class parents
13
. The parents were able to buy the education, 
or otherwise acquire the necessary contacts, for talented sons to rise socially through the 
professions or government more easily, in accordance with the Perkin hypothesis. This in turn may 
have stemmed from, as well as influencing, the development of the economy 
 Evidence about the role of education might be gleaned from the distribution between those 
with a business occupation and the non-business elite. Table 3 does show that the education of 
those in the elite who worked in business was very different from elite members in other 
occupations. They were less likely than non-businessmen to have attended public school or 
Oxbridge. 65% of the non-landowner, non-business elite received formal higher education 
compared with 43% of landowners and 26.5% of the elite in business.  
Table 3 Education and Occupation of the British Elite 1870-1914
14
 
 Business Non-business Landowner 
Public school 17.9% 36.3% 58.2% 
Private school 14.7% 22.7% 1.3% 
State school 14.2% 9.3% 0 
Oxbridge 16.0% 41.4% 43.0% 
Other h.e. 10.5% 23.4% 0 
Source: Perkin/Rubinstein data set SSRC (1977). Note: ‘non-business’ excludes landowners. Excluded 
secondary schools are ‘independent’,‘grant maintained’ and ‘other secondary’. 
 
Many of the upper class (9) originating elite came from very rich families who could 
certainly afford a landowner’s education better than the middle classes entering the professions. 
The explanation is therefore that mostly those in business and in the elite did not want the public 
school and Oxbridge education that they did not have, because of the Church of England bias and 
their non-Anglican backgrounds. Those in the elite were less likely to be members of the Church 
of England if they were working in business (Table 4). Even so, comparison with Hartmut 
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 The middle class as defined here goes some way down the social scale. At the bottom of this stratum was Henry Tate 
(1819-1899) (father’s occupational class 5) in the present sample. His father left £300 in his will when Henry was 17. 
Henry began his working life as a grocer’s assistant. He invented a device for manufacturing ‘Tate’s cube sugar’. This 
contributed to his outstanding accumulation of wealth, to which the Tate Gallery, Liverpool University and many 
other public facilities, all bear witness. 
14
 The data differ from Youssef Cassis (1997) Table 6.3 for 1907 for example in a smaller proportion of businessmen 
in higher education partly because of the earlier period coverage and partly because of different definitions of elites 
employed. Cassis is concerned with CEOs of the 100 largest firms whereas the Perkin-Rubinstein data are more 
eclectic, including people in business in the elite not there because they are in business. 
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Berghoff’s (1995) study of later nineteenth century provincial businessmen implies that the 
national elite in business were more assimilated to the religious, and educational, establishment 
than the business community as a whole
15
. This may be evidence of the absorption by business of 
‘gentry values’ on arrival in the elite, by changing from Nonconformism to Anglicanism for 
example. 
Given their small proportion in the population as a whole, Jews are very prominent in the 
business elite (Table 4). Notable for their absence from business, but not entirely missing from the 
non-business elite are Roman Catholics 
16
. A converse tendency can be seen for Nonconformists. 
The Roman Catholic pattern suggests that, although historical ‘exclusion’ from the state apparatus 
and patronage may often encourage crowding into business, it is not the whole story. There is an 
independent role for culture, for religious adherence to encourage a tendency to chose some 
occupations rather than others, independently of constraints imposed by society
17
. Religion might 
then be the driving force for the pattern of mobility observed (perhaps because of capital access) 
and business only a vehicle for it, contrary to the Schumpeter hypothesis, but more consistent with 
the gentrification doctrine.  
The non-business non-landowner elite – those in the professions - are almost identical to 
the smaller landowner group in that four fifths are adherents of the Church of England. So far as 
sharing religion implies an affinity with landowners, then this is at least consistent with Wiener’s 
(1981 16) identification of ‘anti-capitalist tendencies’ among ‘professionals’. 
Table 4 Religious Denomination and Occupation of the Elite 1870-1914 
 Business Non-business Landowner 
C of England 56.2% 79.3% 80.8% 
C of Scotland 14.8% 7.4% 20.5% 
Jews 11.1% 1.4% 0 
RC 0 3.7% 0 
Nonconformist 16.0% 8.3% 1.3% 
Note: Changes of denomination mean percentages can add to more than 100. 
                                                 
15
  Turning to another sample, the religious distribution in the Dictionary of Business Biography (A-C sample) is 
dominated by ‘unknowns’, rather than by the establishment ‘Church of England’ of Perkin-Rubinstein (Jeremy, 1984). 
Rather more of the Dictionary sample attended Oxbridge (32%) compared with 17% of Perkin-Rubinstein; in this 
respect they were even more ‘establishment’. 
16
 Foreman-Peck and Boccaletti (2002) find a similar under-representation of Roman Catholics among Scottish 
businessmen. 
17
 The evidence on the absence of Catholics from the business elite is consistent with Shane (1996) for US time series 
over the twentieth century. 
 16 
If ‘gentry values’ accompany absorption into the upper class, firm founders would be 
expected to be less ‘establishment’ than directors of family firms. However Anglicans are as well 
represented among founders as among family firms (Table 5). The established religion was 
apparently not detrimental to being a successful entrepreneur and in the elite. Assuming 
Anglicanism is a mark of identification with ‘the establishment’, then the gentrification thesis is in 
some difficulty. It must be combined with better access to capital for firm creation among some 
Anglicans that offsets the supposed impact of their cultural values, if it is to survive.  
Nonconformists, like the Scots, were less common among firm founders (typically their 
families were already established in business). However the Scots seem to be disproportionately 
represented among the family firm owners in the elite, considering their share of the British 
population, whereas the reverse is true of Nonconformist. Again a capital access explanation 
seems possible. Jews, as relatively new arrivals, accounted for a higher proportion of start-up 
entrepreneurs than of the established business elite.
18
  
Table 5 Firm Type and Religious Denomination 
 Founder Family firm 
C of England 57.1% 57.2% 
C of Scotland  14.3% 21.6% 
Jews 14.3% 7.8% 
Nonconformist 14.3% 27.4% 
Note: not all cases in the elite could be classified so the totals of this table are smaller than in those preceding. 
 
An initial examination of the elite data set then suggests that business seemed to favour 
manual workers and the professions, the middle classes. Family firms were an especially powerful 
conservative force in mobility to the elite and founders played a minor role. Education followed or 
was associated with religious denomination and divided those with landowners from the family 
firm elite. But the established religion was apparently no deterrent to founding firms and elite 
membership. However all of these conclusions, derived from bivariate associations, may not be 
robust to multivariate analysis. 
 
4 .Multivariate Analysis 
To test whether this is so, a multinomial logit equation is estimated first for three categories 
of elite members; those with ‘manual’ fathers, those with ‘middle class’ fathers and, as the base 
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case, those with ‘upper class’ fathers19. The business effect identified by the cross -tabulation 
(table 1) is supported by this analysis (table 6). Business occupation strongly increases the chances 
of being in the elite when originating from the upper echelons of society; the marginal effects 
range from 0.17 to 0.47 depending on the equation specification. On the other hand business 
occupation reduces the probability of being in the elite and originating from a ‘ middle class’ 
family – by 0.21 to 0.50 depending on specification. These findings accord with table 1, with the 
added information that the result still holds when other possible influences on social mobility are 
controlled. For manual worker fathers there is a positive effect of business (0.02 to 0.03). So the 
Schumpeter contention continues to be born out in one respect but not in another.  
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
More surprising is the significant negative effect of the ‘date of birth’ variable. The more 
recently an elite entrant was born, the less likely they were to have a manual father, other things 
being equal. Over a decade, the impact on probability of elite membership was small 
(0.00023-0.00048 depending upon equation specification) but so too were the chances of anybody 
with this background entering the elite. The effects of ‘time’ were, by contrast, benign for the 
middle social category. In these years bureaucratisation and professionalisation enhanced the role 
played by formal education in mobility. Interpreting the negative trend for those with manual 
fathers as an ‘employer demand for educated personnel’ effect 20  reinforces the view that 
professionalisation favoured those from middle class backgrounds.  
Those entering the elite from lower social strata were unlikely to have received a public 
school education (equation (5) table 6). Even for those in the elite with middle class parents, 
‘public school’ is a negative predictor, and ‘state school’ a positive predictor. Middle class 
children did not usually attend public schools; education mattered but not public school education, 
                                                                                                                                                             
18
 Jews were estimated to account for perhaps 0.2% of the UK population rising to just under 1 percent before the First 
World War (personal communication from Andrew Godley). On Jewish entrepreneurship more generally see Godley 
(2001). 
19‘Manual’ fathers included- unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled manual and supervisory (non-manual and manual) classes 
IIIi to V coded 1-4 in figure 1 above. ‘Upper class’ fathers covered landowners, and company director or asset 
manager fathers- classes Iii and Ii or 9 and 10. The ‘middle class’ were lower professional, small business and 
manager, farmer, higher professional and managerial, coded 5-8 classes Iiii, to IIiii. See Appendix para.8. 
20 Although adding the wealth variable affects signs on the date of birth coefficient for some social origins 
the negative effect of birth date on those with manual worker fathers remains robust. Father’s wealth increases  with 
time and so is correlated with ‘date of birth’. 
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a result which runs counter to Bill Rubinstein’s (1986) claim that the poorer the family background 
of the elite member, the more likely he was to attend public school. 
Oxbridge education adds nothing to the explanatory power of the model (in the 
specification of equation (4) not reported). Any Oxbridge entrant in the elite will almost certainly 
have attended public school, although not all in the elite who attended public school went on to 
Oxbridge.  
Being a firm founder increases the chances of an elite member having a middle class father. 
This is not so for those with manual fathers however, even though working in business raises the 
probability that an elite member’s father was manual. These findings are consistent with 
substantial capital rationing preventing mobility through starting a successful business for the sons 
of manual workers. This conclusion indicates that the simple cross-tabulation of Table 2, showing 
little variation in the proportion who were founders originating in each class, could encourage 
misleading inferences.  
Father’s wealth at death has a significant negative effect on the chances of an elite member 
originating in the lower social strata, and a positive impact on the probability of the elite member 
having an upper class father (equations (1) and (3) Table 6). Those originating in the lower strata 
would have been unlikely to inherit as much as those in the higher. But the effect is more muted for 
those with manual fathers because their chances of getting into the elite were so small anyway and 
their small numbers make it difficult to estimate marginal effects with precision. Even though 
missing data substantially reduces the number of usable observations, there is still a positive 
‘business’ effect after controlling for the impact of ‘father’s wealth’. 
Political participation at any level above passive party member is a negative influence on 
elite members with manual and with middle class fathers- but large and positive for the upper class 
(equations (4) and (5) Table 6). That is, the chances of being in the elite with a manual father are 
reduced with political participation. Politics was a rich man’s hobby, not a means of upward 
mobility. This conclusion is slightly modified when landowner fathers are identified as a separate 
class (Table 7). Political participation increases the chances of being in the elite with a landowner 
father but has no effect on those in the business upper class. Landowners were likely to be in the 
elite because of their political participation, the business upper class were not. 
 [TABLE  7 ABOUT HERE] 
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Separating father’s class ‘landowner’ from others in the upper class casts further light on 
the ‘gentrification’ concept of absorption of the business class by the landowners, as far as the elite 
is concerned (Table 7). Marked differences are apparent between the characteristics of those in the 
elite whose father’s were landowners and those in the other upper class (9). Dissimilarities in 
political participation have already been noted. Elite landowners patronised public schools 
whereas this type of education was not a predictor for the others- confirming the pattern of the 
education in Table 3, but now when controlling for other influences on mobility.  
The education pattern is explained by the distinction between signalling and human capital 
investment. Professionals, not in business as defined here, were nonetheless in the market for 
clients. But their clients were likely to originate from higher socio-economic strata and therefore 
there could be an advantage from acquiring ‘signals’, such as attending Oxbridge, acceptable to 
these people. By contrast the clients of much of business were often impersonal- establishing what 
could be sold to them, and how, would depend little on what could be learned at the elite 
educational institutions. Moreover examinations were more important for professionals and civil 
servants than in business. Upwardly mobile civil servants also needed to impress Ministers and 
other superiors who will have absorbed upper class values; table manners honed at Oxbridge could 
pay-off. Certainly no top civil servant in the elite originated from the manual working classes in 
this period.  
The impact of ‘fathers wealth’ differs between the upper class groups – not significantly 
diverging from zero for landowners. Being a landowner was what mattered for entry to the elite, 
not how much was land was owned, over a certain threshold. Being in business was a positive 
predictor for the non-landowner group and a negative influence for the landowners. With the 
passage of time the chances of being in the elite with fathers of both upper class groups were 
reduced but the effect was greater for non-landowners. David Cannadine (1990 296) noted that the 
landed aristocracy was increasingly a victim of bureaucratisation, specialisation and expertise in 
these years. This result shows the effect to have been more general among the upper class. For the 
middle and manual class fathers the pattern is similar to the three category case.  
 20 
 
Table 8 Religion and Parental Occupation in the British Elite 1870-1914
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 C of E Nonconf C of S Jews RC 
Manual 57.1% 14.3% 28.6% 0% 0% 
Middle 70.7% 11.6% 13.4.% 1.2% 3.0% 
Upper (9) 59.2% 19.2% 8.3% 10.8% 0% 
Landowner 85.9% 0% 14.1% 0% 1.4% 
 
Religious denomination is entirely irrelevant to mobility (not reported- the four 
denominations Church of Scotland, Church of England, Jews and Nonconformists included in a 
multinomial logit model attained a 2 of only 1.4). Equation (4) Table 7 is illustrative; the ‘Church 
of England’ marginal effect is insignificant for all four classes. In this respect the British elite 
between 1870 and 1914 appear to reflect a secular, integrated society, based on wealth. In view of 
the Victorian emphasis on religion and the struggle between the denominational education 
societies over the control of education, this conclusion might seem surprising. The reason is that 
other more fundamental factors, especially class, are correlated with religion
22
. Table 8 shows the 
religion-parental occupation pattern in the elite. There is a clear variation of class with religion 
among the elite, though the configuration is not simple.  
The impact of the correlation of religion and class is most clearly demonstrated in the 
determinants of being in business (Table 9). Given that a person was a member of the elite, other 
things being equal, membership of the Church of England markedly reduced the chances of being 
a businessman (equations 1,2 and 4). Conversely being Jewish or a member of the Church of 
Scotland increased the probability. Nonconformists showed a weaker tendency towards business 
but only at the 10% level of significance. Controlling for Church of England membership, 
attending Oxford or Cambridge Universities- and being in the elite- reduced the likelihood of 
being a businessman by slightly more than the religious affiliation. By contrast attending public 
school, although a negative influence, was smaller and less statistically significant. 
 [TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
At first sight then religion, a quantified cultural variable, determined the successful choice 
of a business career. The English ‘establishment’ – in contrast to the Scottish - was in this sense 
                                                 
21
 This table contrasts with Table 4 which shows the relationship between religion and occupation, rather than religion 
and origins, of elite members. 
22
 This finding is consistent with the thesis presented by Bill Rubinstein (1996) as far as Jews in Britain are concerned. 
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apparently biassed against business, as Wiener and others have contended. But when class origins 
are included in the equation (5) Table 9, religion becomes irrelevant. Equation (5) and variants 
indicate that, other things being equal, landowner fathers reduced the chances of sons in the elite 
working in business and the same was true of middle class parents.  
The association between business and class in the elite could be a manifestation of ‘gentry 
values’, but more plausibly is explained by two slightly different factors. The first is that 
landowners were rich enough not to work at anything -unless politics counts as a job -and indulged 
themselves. This interpretation merely requires the standard assumptions of neoclassical 
economics about human nature, not ‘gentry values’. The second is that business development was 
simply not fast enough to provide sufficient employment acceptable to the middle classes to match 
the professions and the civil service. The prominence of the first factor reflects the skewed British 
income distribution and the second the rather slow economic growth of the period
23
.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Study of elites identifies structural features of society that make for greater or lesser 
mobility. Elites of predominantly market-based societies may be expected to differ from those of 
the less commercially-orientated, but nonetheless all societies depend on a range of other social 
institutions, as well as markets. Thus predictions – like Schumpeter’s - about their elites will 
depend upon the particularities of time and place.  
The extreme inequalities of late Victorian Britain, and minimal state support for 
investment in human capital already suggest that social mobility into the elite would be low. 
Access to education appears to have been a key to mobility through the professions. Educational 
trends and changes in the economy seemed to favour those from the middle classes and handicap 
sons of manual worker families. Business was less subject to this influence than the professions – 
entry and exit were freer- and therefore was a more effective channel for mobility into the elite for 
children of manual workers.  
The rationing of resources according to family background was also reflected in the small 
number of successful firm founders in the elite. The vast majority of the population, manual 
workers, had little access to equity capital and therefore could not start companies. Their chances 
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 Moaz and Maov’s (1999)  model of earnings  mobility and economic growth suggests a link between these two 
factors. 
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of entering the elite by this channel were therefore low. The predominance of family firms was the 
other side of the coin. Established families with capital did not need to found firms because they 
already inherited them, and the inheritors in the elite were typically from upper class families. 
Resources similarly explain why land-owner education (public school and Oxbridge) could spread 
among the middle classes aspiring to the professions, because these families could afford to pay 
for it, unlike most of the population.  
On the other hand, the liberal politics of a market-based society meant that ‘outsiders’, like 
Jews, who were able to accumulate wealth through business, were relatively easily absorbed into 
the elite. Religion or denomination was in fact irrelevant to the pattern of elite mobility, despite the 
apparent importance to late Victorian society. The paradox is resolved by the close correlation of 
class and religion and by the key role of class. The established English, but not Scottish, apparent 
religious bias against business reflected class and profession rather than a more deep-seated 
influence of religion.  
The upper stratum, from which the elite was most commonly drawn, was not in fact 
homogenous. The ‘gentry’ in the elite, the landowners, were primarily fulfilling their traditional 
role of political leadership, whereas the business upper class-originating elite members were much 
less likely to participate in national politics substantially. Business families with sons in the elite 
were not ‘gentrified’- in the sense of adopting the same religious denomination and education as 
landowners. To the extent that elite heterogeneity is beneficial, this pattern therefore should have 
contributed positively to economic development. On the other hand the strength of both groups 
reflected the inequality of income distribution in Late Victorian and Edwardian Britain, and this 
may well have pulled in the opposite direction. 
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APPENDIX A. Inverse Probability and Mobility into the Elite 
Let E signify elite membership and Xi originating from class i. Then Peter Temin (1999) proposes 
considering P(XiE), whereas the conventional social mobility focus is P(EXi) (which is 
extremely small). The relation between these, given by the inverse probability rule, is P(EXi)= 
[P(XiE).P(E)]/P(Xi). If we know the chances of being in the elite (P(E)) and the chances of 
originating in class i (P(Xi)) then we can calculate the  probability of being in the elite having 
originated in class i (P(EXi)) from the chances of originating in class i, given that the person is in 
the elite (P(Xi E)).   
The influence of business or other occupation upon the chances of someone in the elite originating 
in a certain class
 
is P(Xi EB) where B is business. A test of the significance of business is 
whether P(Xi EB) > P(Xi E) . Slightly different is the influence of business or other occupation 
upon the probability of a member of a certain class joining the elite P(E  Xi B) .Again, the 
relationship between the two depends upon the relative proportions of those from the class of 
interest employed in business and those in the elite in a business occupation (A1) 
P(Xi EB) =  P(E Xi B) . P(Xi B) /P(EB) = P(E Xi B). [P(Xi).P(BXi)]/[P(E).(P(BE)].                                                                             
…(A1) 
 
The test of whether secondary education (S) adds independently of business occupation to the 
chances of a person in the elite originating in class Xi is whether  
P(Xi EBS) >  P(Xi E B).                                                                            …(A2) 
The probability we obtain from looking at the elite (the left term of the inequality (A2)) can be 
found from three terms;  
1) the probability for the population as a whole of being an elite member originating in class i with 
secondary education and working in business  times  
2) the chances of a member of class i being occupied in business and receiving secondary 
education divided by 
3) the probability that an elite member has a business occupation and secondary education.  
P(Xi EBS) = P(E Xi BS) . P(Xi BS) /P(EBS).                               ...(A3) 
The ratio of these last two probabilities  (on the right of equation A3) will be substantially greater 
than one because class i is large relative to the elite. Therefore the elite probability on the left of the 
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above equation will be larger than the first term on the right - the chances of a member of class i 
working in business and with secondary education getting in to the elite.   
The chances of being in the elite having worked in business and originating from the manual 
occupation groups (P(E Xi B)), can be found as follows. From table 1 P(XiB  E) = 0.059. In 
addition P(E)  0.000005 and P(Xi)  0.75  Therefore 
(P(E Xi B)) = 0.059 x 0.000005 x P(BE)/ 0.75 x P(BX) 
If for the sake of argument the two conditional probabilities above were equal  
(P(BE)= P(BX)), 
then (P(E Xi B)) = 3.93333E-07 or just under 4 chances in 10 million. 
That the chances of establishing a successful firm and being in the elite were very different 
between those of different social origins can be shown as follows. Where F is ‘founder’ 
P(XiEF = P(EXiF) .P(XiF)/P(EF) = [P(EXiF). P(Xi).P(XiF)]/[P(E).P(E F)].                                                                                                         
…(A5) 
The relative sizes of class i and the elite, P(Xi)/P(E), is a large number. Although P(XiF) is likely 
to be smaller than P(E F), this effect will not be nearly sufficient to offset the different sizes of the 
two groups. So P(EXiF) < P(XiEF; for all classes the chances of being in the elite given that 
they were founders was less than the probability of originating in that class and being in the elite 
having founded a firm. 
The left hand side term of A5 for the manual (say, i) and middle (say, j) classes  are similar 
according to Table 2. But since P(Xi)>P(Xj) , P(Xi F) < P(XjF); the propensity to found firms 
from the manual worker class must be smaller. 
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Appendix B: British Elite 1870-1914 Data  
Data Source: ESRC Data Archive 
Original Data Compiler: Harold Perkin (1977) 
 
1. Data Recoding 
The data were available in a spreadsheet, but in a format unsuitable for statistical and 
econometric analysis e.g. the fields contained string variables rather than numerical 
responses. They therefore required re-coding before analysis could begin.  Fields 
containing a number of responses were divided into several new fields requiring [0,1] 
inputs.   
2. Data Restriction 
The data set was restricted to those individuals who died before 1914, thus avoiding 
complications in the measurement of wealth at death that would arise during periods of 
inflation. 
3. Wealth Variables 
Elite personal wealth at death is recorded in two forms, probate value and land rental. 
Perkin (1978) used the New Domesday Book (Return of Owners of Land 1874-6) to 
identify landownership and was able to trace most of the heirs and successors of John 
Bateman’s The Great Landowners of Great Britain and Ireland 1879 (to 1883). Land held 
in London is omitted, as are woodlands elsewhere. To construct a total wealth figure the 
rental must be converted into a capital sum. Rentals are valued at 1879-1883 prices. A 
constant price land value is created with a rent multiplier of 30 or 20 and added to a 
constant price probate value (with the same base) to create a total wealth measure. The 
nineteenth century price level was fairly stable compared with that of the twentieth 
century. (The relationship between rentals (LAND) and land values will change with 
expectations of future rent falls and changes in the interest rate.  Rubinstein [Perkin (1977, 
App.4)] proposed a multiplier of 33 during the Golden Age, 20 during the post 1879 
depression period, and 10 after 1897.) Settled personal wealth is excluded throughout but 
only the very rich are affected [Perkin (1977)]. Valuations are gross of personal debts and 
funeral expenses.  
4. Businessmen vs. Non-Businessmen 
Businessmen were defined by their first or second occupation being in manufacturing or 
commerce, rather than in agriculture, the professions, services or public administration and 
defence, using the categories originally chosen Harold Perkin. 
5. Identification of Individuals 
Harold Perkin provided the original hand-written data sheets, as compiled by his then 
research assistant, Bill Rubinstein. Individuals were distinguished in the spreadsheet only 
by identity numbers, but the new data enabled the researchers to recognise them by name. 
Additional biographical data, contained in this paper, were obtained from searches of 
world wide web sites and the CD-ROM of Who’s Who in the UK? and Who Was Who in the 
UK?. 
6. Start-ups, Independents, Family Firms, Innovators 
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New dummy variables were introduced to identify those who had started-up their own 
business; those who had gained their business experience through joining an independent 
firm; and those who had entered business by joining a family firm.  These variables are not 
always mutually exclusive. An additional variable was defined to identify those who were 
innovative or entrepreneurial through having introduced new products, process or work 
practices (derived from the Dictionary of Business Biography, The Dictionary of National 
Biography (various editions), The Concise Dictionary of National Biography (various 
editions), Who Was Who 1897-1915?, Who’s Who on CD-ROM, and W Rubinstein’s 
(1981) Men of Property, London: Croom Helm. 
 
7 Political Participation  
Defined as the HIGHEST level of  political participation of the individual was measured on 
a seven point scale, as follows:  
7 - Cabinet 
6 - Government 
5 - Backbench MP 
4 - Backbench Peer 
3 - Local Government 
2 - Political organisation worker 
1 - Party member, non-worker 
 
8 Social Class of Father  
 
Variable Coding  Class Definition 
 
FATHCLAS = 10   Ii Landowner 
  9   Iii Company director or asset manager 
  8   Iiii Higher professional & managerial 
  7   IIi Farmer 
  6   IIii Small business & manager 
  5   IIiii Lower professional 
  4   IIIi Non-manual & manual supervisory 
  3   IIIii Skilled manual 
  2   IV Semi-skilled 
  1   V Unskilled    
 
 30 
Figure 1 The Elite and British Society 1870-1914
Founders
Founders
Business
Inheritors
Managers and
other employees
                    Business Elite                   Non-Business Elite
Landed Gentry Professionals- Lawyers,
Civil Servants
The Elite
Class
Higher professional & managerial
7 Farmer
6 Small business & manager
5 Lower professional
4 Supervisory
3 Skilled manual
2 Semi-skilled
1 Unskilled
Upper class (landowner)
Upper class (non-landowner)
8
9
10 }
}
}Manual
Upper
Middle{
{
{
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Table 6. Marginal Effects on an Elite Member's Probabilities of  a Father from a Given Class 
(at mean of characteristics) 
Upper class 
father (0) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Date of Birth x 
10-3 
-0.26. 
(-7.50) 
0.04 
 . (2.57) 
-0.29 
.( -8.66)   .  
-0.10   
 ( -3.98)    
-0.14  . 
 ( -4.89) 
Businessman 0.47 
(7.17) 
0.24        (4.84) 0.44 
    (6.97) 
0.17   
 (3.63) 
0.35 
(5.89)  
Public School 
 
- - -  0.25 
(4.44) 
State School   -0.41 
(-3.24) 
-0.67      
(-5.80)    
-  -0.62 
(-5.17) 
Founder - - -  -0.24 
(-1.93) 
Father’s wealth 
at death (log) 
 0.058  
(5.25) 
- 0.066  
(6.06) 
  
Political 
participat 
- - - 0.34 
(6.91) 
0.32 
(6.00) 
Middle Class 
Father (1) 
     
Date of Birth x 
10-3 
 0 .30   
.( 8.52) 
0.006 
 (0.41) 
0.33  (9.66)  0.13  
 (5.25) 
0.17 
 (5.80)   .  
Businessman -0.50 
(-7.56) 
-0.27  
 ( -5.41)    
 -0.47  
(-7.42) 
-0.21 
(-4.29) 
-0.37  
( -6.28) 
Public School 
 
 - -  -0.23 
(-4.15) 
State School 0.39 
(3.11) 
0.62  
(5.61) 
- - 0.59 
 (4.99) 
Founder - - -  0.25 
(2.10) 
Father’s Wealth 
at death (log) 
-0.054  
( -5.00) 
-  -0.062  
(-5.78) 
-  
Political 
participat 
- - - -0.31   
( -6.34) 
-0.30 
(-5.56) 
Manual 
worker father 
(2) 
     
Date of Birth x 
10-3 
-0.036   
.( -3.10) 
-0.048   
(-5.33) 
-0.035   
(-3.22) 
-0.031   
 (-3.73) 
-0.023  . 
( -2.45) 
Businessman 0.027 
 (1.77) 
0.030 
  (2.39) 
0.032  
(2.05) 
0.031  
 (2.86) 
0.019  
(1.75) 
Public School 
 
- - -  -0.019   
(-1.15) 
State School 0.022 
  (1.41) 
0.047 
 (2.71)   
-   0.036 
  (2.17) 
Founder - - - - -0.015   
(  -.79)    
Father’s Wealth 
at death (log) 
-0.0038  . 
(-2.36) 
- -0.0044 
.( -2.52)    
-  
Political 
participat 
- - - 0.0321   
(-2.88) . 
-0.27 
(-2.31) 
No.obs. 343 537 343 537      537      
LL -199.2 –388.4 -206.0 -389.7 -344.9 
RLL -276.4 -430.9 -276.4 -430.9 -430.8 
2 (df) 154.3(6) 84.8 (4) 140.7(4) 82.3(4) 171.8 (10) 
Probs. At the 
mean vector  
 0= .372  
1= .609  
2= .020 
0= .558  
1= .421 
 2= .021 
 0= .377 1= 
.602 2= 
.021     
0= .562  
1= .416  
2= .022 
 0= .561 
1= .422  
2= .017 
Notes: Father’s wealth at death is probate value. ‘Founders’ may be understated. Apart from Public and state, schools can be’ 
independent’, ‘grant aided’ or ‘other’. Ratio of marginal effect to standard error in parentheses . 
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Table 7 
Marginal effects on probability of being in the elite, distinguishing landowner fathers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Landowner Father     
Date of Birth x 10-3 -0.031 
(-2.07) 
-0.072 
( -4.11) 
-0.16 
(-7.34) 
-0.21  . 
(-5.27) 
Businessman -0.36 
(-7.46) 
-0.54E-01 
( -2.15) 
-.36 
(-7.93) 
-0.47 
(-7.91) 
Public School 0.29 
(7.03) 
0.08 
(3.00) 
0.22 
(5.54) 
0.22 
(4.41) 
Father’s Wealth at death - 0.0009 
(0.264) 
- - 
Political participation - 0.043 
(1.66) 
0 .35 
(6.99) 
0.44 
(6.41) 
Church of England    0.06 
(0.93) 
Other Upper Class Father     
Date of Birth x 10-3 -0.16 
(-10.0) 
-0.31 
.( -9.74) 
-0.14 
( -6.27) 
-.074 
( -2.30) 
Businessman 0.53 
(11.79) 
0.50  
(7.74) 
0.55 
(11.92) 
0.55 
(10.74) 
Public School 0.028 
(0.57) 
-0.044 
(-60) 
0.051 
(0 .95) 
0.027 
. (0.46) 
Father’s Wealth at death - 0.06 
(5.84) 
-  
Political Participation - 0.018 
(0.77) 
-0.073 
( -1.48) 
-0.15 
(-2.74) 
Church of England    -0.06  . 
( -1.09) 
Middle Class Father     
Date of Birth x 10-3 0.22 
( 10.81) 
0.41 
(11.73) 
0.32 
(11.51) 
0.30  . 
( 7.03) 
Businessman -0.20 
( -3.82) 
-0.48 
(-7.09) 
-0.23 
(-4.05) 
-0.098 
(-1.49) 
Public school -0.28 
(-4.97) 
-0.039 
( -0.50) 
-0.24 
(-4.02) 
-0.23 
(-3.67) 
Father’s Wealth at death - -0.06 
( -5.64) 
-  
Political participation - -0.42 
(  -0.64) 
-0.24 
(-4.33) 
-0.26 
(-3.97) 
Church of England    0.01 
(0.16) 
Manual worker father     
Date of Birth x 10-3 -0.035 
( -2.98) 
-0.027 
( -2.43) 
-0.023  . 
(-2.48) 
-0.015 
(-1.55) 
Businessman 0.036 
(2.29) 
0 .035 
.( 2.08) 
0.035  . 
(2.31) 
0.009  . 
(0.68) 
Public School -0.043 
( -2.29) 
0.003  . 
(0.15) 
-0.03 
( -1.61) 
-0.015  . 
( -0.87) 
Father’s Wealth at death (log) - -0.004 
( -2.28) 
- - 
Political participation - -0.02 
( -1.51) 
-0.03 
(-2.26) 
-0.02  . 
(-1.63) 
Church of England    -0.005  . 
(-.39) 
No.obs. 537 343 537 432 
LL -489.9 -240.5 -454.9 -356.3 
RLL -636.0 -340.0 -636.0 -499.1 
2 (df) 292.2 (6) 198.8 (12) 362.3 (9) 285.5 (12) 
Probs. At the mean vector 0= .218 
1= .235 
2= .522 
3= .025 
0= .050 
1= .277 
2= .654 
3= .019 
0= .174 
1= .252 
2= .552 
3= .022 
0= .225 
1= .236 
2= .522 
3= .017 
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Table 9 
Religion and the choice of business among the British ‘elite’- marginal effects 
 
 (1) Dep. var. 
‘Business’ 
(2) Dep. var.  
‘Business’ 
(3) Dep. var.  
‘Business’ 
(4) Dep. var.  
‘Business’ 
(5) Dep. var.  
‘Business’ 
Date of birth 0.12E-04   
 (0.43) 
 -0.89E-04  
(-2.30) 
0.35E-04  
(0 .88) 
0.85E-05  
.(0.97) 
Ch of Scotland  -0.059 
(-0.96) 
 0.26 
 (2.32 ) 
- 0.47 
 (1.67) 
Jews  0.41 
(2.80) 
0.55 
(2.80)  
- 0.37 
(1.12) 
Ch of England -0.17 
(-3.22) 
-0.21 
(-9.20) 
-  -0.22 
 (-2.99) 
0.16 
(0.61) 
Nonconformist  0.09 
(1.32) 
0.16 
 (1.69) 
 0.21 
(0.78) 
Fathers Wealth 
at death (log) 
 - 0.01 
 (1.78) 
0.01 
(1.81) 
-0.002   
( -.24) 
Public school 
 
-0.10 
(-1.62) 
-   - 
Political 
participation 
0.08 
(1.59) 
 0.18 
 (2.49) 
0.17 
(2.46) 
0.17 
(1.98) 
Oxbridge -0.19 
( -3.15) 
- -0.35 
(-4.44) 
-0.35 
(-4.49)  
 -0.31 
(-3.30) 
Father’s 
occupational 
class  
- - - - Landowner = 
   -0.82 (-3.91) 
Upper = 
0.64   (6.57) 
Middle = 
-0.48 (-1.43) 
No.obs. 456    457 271 271   260 
LL -271.1 -277.5 -160.6 -164.3 -123.4 
RLL -297.3 -298.3 -187.7 -187.7 -180.0 
2 (df) 52.4(4) 41.7 (3) 54.3 (6) 46.9 (4) 113.3(10) 
Note: ratio of marginal effect to standard error in parentheses 
 
